B-2-C Pre-dispute Arbitration Clauses, E-commerce Trust Construction and Jenga: “keeping Every Cog and Wheel” by Aslam, Mohammed A.
M. A. Aslam: B-2-C Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses ... 1
B-2-C PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES, 
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In its pro-consumer stance the EU has reaffirmed its commitment to ban pre-dis-
pute arbitration clauses in its new Proposals for a Directive on ADR, and a Regu-
lation on a Common European Sales Law.  This course of direction has begun des-
pite the fact that cross border B-2-C e-commerce sales are below expectations.  The  
EU does not need reminding building trust in e-commerce is essential. However,  
trust construction needs to be re-examined from the perspective of ODR if a genu-
ine concern exists to build the right form of trust. This article adopts a multi-dis -
ciplinary approach to re-assess the legitimacy of pre-dispute arbitrations clauses in  
the e-B-2-C low-value/high-volume Clip-Wrap context. What is proposed is to view  
them from an interest-based system trust approach.  Under this reframing they are  
regarded as  strategic  “imperative  cogs”,  which are  essential  in building system  
trust.  These need to work with crowdsourced consumer-centric business models to  
produce sustainable system trust and predictability via perceived fairness.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“The land is one organism. Its parts, like our own parts, 
compete with each other and co-operate with each other. 
* LLM, Mohammed A. Aslam. Email: aburubayka@gmail.com. The research aspect of this art-
icle was supervised by Associate Professor Subhajit Basu, University of Leeds.
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The competitions are as much a part of the inner work-
ings as the co-operations.  You can regulate them--cau-
tiously--but not abolish them.” – Aldo Leopold1
Jenga is a game that tests a structure’s integrity and equilibrium by remov-
ing its foundations, whilst simultaneously building on top of it. This oxy-
moronic idiosyncrasy is not otiose, but rather is linked to an end-game – 
skeletal efficiency, ridding the system of the superfluous, inefficient and the 
unproductive.  Keeping  only  those  components  that  provide  a  necessary 
function, translated as having an essential symbiotic disposition when inter-
connected with other components, is key to future development and pro-
gress. Furthermore, the loss of unnecessary components may be an absorb-
able loss, can the same however be said for one that directly/indirectly influ-
ences the chassis? Concerning such, any misunderstandings or misapplica-
tions leading to intrusions for modification can alter the ‘precarious state of 
equanimity’, bringing the whole structure tumbling down.2
This metaphor fits perfectly with the course of direction adopted by the 
EU. The EU is abolishing pre-dispute arbitration clauses while at the same 
time wanting to construct better workings to facilitate e-B-2-C dispute resol-
ution. This is all in the midst of lamenting for trust enhancement in e-com-
merce.  At  present  the  EU views  pre-dispute  arbitration  clauses  from its 
long-standing  ideological  narrative  of  ‘consumer  protectionism’.  It  views 
such clauses as tools gone rogue by businesses, stemming from the underly-
ing state of inequality of bargaining powers. Businesses use them to have 
greater control in settling future disputed claims.  Accordingly, in its latest 
proposals for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law and a Direct-
ive on Alternative Dispute Resolution, the EU has indicated a ban with pos-
sible  exceptions  on pre-dispute  arbitration  clauses.3 This  move is  highly 
1 Leopold, Aldo. Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There (1st edition ed.1 New 
York: Oxford University Press. 1949) 152. Available at: <http://leopold.wilderness.net/abou-
tus/aldo.htm.> last accessed: 13/12/2012.
2 This metaphor was adopted from an online comment.  Mike,  ‘Keeping Every Cog And 
Wheel’, 10,000 Birds, posted 13/08/2007 
Available at: <http://10000birds.com/keep-every-cog-and-wheel.htm> last accessed 29/12/12
3 Commission, 'Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on Consumer ADR)' COM(2011) 793/2. Com-
mission, 'Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on On-
line Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes (Regulation on Consumer ADR)' C(2011) 
794/2.   See  also  Art.  84(d)  of  the  Commission  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  on  Common 
European Sales Law COM(2011) 635 final.
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problematic especially in the context of the rising popular business practise 
of instantaneous e-B-2-C low-value/high volume clip-wrap agreements.  
Platforms like  eBay and Amazon, through their own private renderings, 
have revolutionised how low value products are bought and sold across 
borders.  In doing so, certain “intra-contractual” traditions,  practices,  and 
expectations are emerging forming norms that are shaping consumer and 
seller behaviour and the resolution of disputes.4 These are intrinsic to the 
sensitive  peripheral  nervous  system,  infused  in  the  ecological  design 
between ODR and e-commerce. This nervous system is symbiotically inter-
connected to  their  myriad  legal/non-legal  organs,  which  if  impaired  can 
lead to the loss  of  trust in them. Can proscribing pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses  therefore  be  done  so  austerely,  without  considering  its  con-
sequences on the ODR system, e-commerce, and trust?  
This  article  re-examines  the EU’s  Jenga policy  and questions whether 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses should be banished to the dustbin of history, 
especially when the emerging framework for ODR mechanisms are still in 
their infancy. It will analyse the EU and US approaches, and propose a re-
framing that views them as “imperative cogs” in low value/high volume 
transactions, contributing to overall system trust.
2. CURTAILING THE REPEAT PLAYER PHENOMENON
2.1 THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF “REPEAT PLAYERS” AND 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
It is argued the traditional litigation system is intrinsically unbalanced as it 
is  grounded upon a perpetual  cycle of insurmountable  cost  and protrac-
tion.5 For  Galanter  this  imbalance  of  power  stems  from  the  deliberate 
choices made by the “repeat players”, the “Haves”.6 Empowered by their 
accumulated resources, they are able to inhibit litigation and thereby sub-
jugate the “one-shoters”, the less privileged “Have-Nots”.7 This long-term 
power orgy of strategic repetitiveness and subjugation leads to their inevit -
4 Schmitz, A., ‘Consideration Of “Contracting Culture” In Enforcing Arbitration Provisions’ 
(2007) Vol.81 St John’s Law Review, 123-172, 148-154.
5 Bok, Derek, C., ‘A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training’ (1983) 33 J. Of Legal Educ. 
570, 570-585 
6 Galanter, Marc., ‘Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change’ (1974) 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 98-100
7 Galanter, Marc., ‘Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change’ (1974) 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 98-100
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able and constant success.8 Ameliorating patterns of technological progress 
have inevitability meant repeat-playing has reshaped and reconfigured it-
self to reflect the times.9 Now, it is argued repeat players utilise pre-dispute 
arbitration  clauses  in  contracts  as  personalised  instruments,  forcing  con-
sumer proclivity to accept peace rather than justice. As a blank canvass they 
are designed unilaterally to favour a business’s substantive rights and aspir-
ations.10 In many cases they consolidate objective control via determining 
the Neutral, the forum, the law, and above all “preclude consumers from 
the alternative cost-spreading technique of class actions”.11 Click-wrap boil-
erplate contracts vacuum consumer choice by imposing clandestine man-
datory arbitration clauses “on a take-it-or-leave-it basis”, leaving no oppor-
tunity to reconsider litigation.12 The stunted party would be less willing to 
face-off in a fluid system contaminated by free riders, settling for far less 
than the equitable.13 This coherence of a predetermined procedural frame-
work is a major point of contention. It not only stifles access to justice by the 
lack  of  real  consent,  restricts  bargaining  capabilities,  prevents  aggregate 
claims and approach to the courts.14 It also destines a compromised and in-
consistent procedural fairness throughout the arbitration process. 
8 Galanter, Marc., ‘Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change’ (1974) 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 98-100
9 Grossman, J. B., Kritzer, H. M., Macaulay, S., ‘Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?’ (1999) 
33 Law & Soc'y Rev. 803, 809
10 Sternlight, J. R., ‘Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?’ (2005) 57 Stan. L. Rev.1631
11 C. F. Rickett and G. W. Telfer (Eds.), International Perspectives On Consumers’ Access To 
Justice. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 11; Schiavetta, S., 'Does the Internet  
Occasion New Directions in Consumer Arbitration in the EU?’ (2004) 3 The Journal of In -
formation, Law and Technology (JILT)
Available  at:  <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law2/elj/jilt/2004_3/schiavetta/>  last  ac-
cessed: 31/07/2012 ; Eisenberg, T., Miller, G. P., and Sherwin, E., ‘Arbitration’s Summer Sol-
diers: An Empirical Study Of Arbitration Clauses In Consumer And Non-Consumer Con-
tracts’ (Summer 2008) 41:4 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 871. (Authors ar-
gue empirical studies indicate primary use of mandatory arbitration clauses by business is  
to prevent aggregate claims.) 
12 Alderman, Richard M., ‘Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call 
for Reform’ (2006) Journal of Texas Consumer Law 58, 59; Sternlight, J. R., ‘Creeping Man-
datory Arbitration: Is It Just?’ (2005) 57 Stan. L. Rev.1631, 1631-1632; Schwartz, D. S., ‘Enfor-
cing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age  
of Compelled Arbitration’  (1997) 33 Wis. L. Rev., 37, 72.
13 Menkel-Meadow, C., ‘Do the “Haves” come out ahead in Alternative Justice Systems: Re-
peat Players in ADR’ (1999-2000) 15 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 19, 52-53.
14 Drahozal, C. R., and Rutledge, P. B., ‘Contract and Procedure’ (Summer 2010) Vol. 94, No.1, 
Marq. L. Rev. pp.103-1172, 1170; Schmitz, Amy J. ‘Legislating in the Light: Considering Em-
pirical Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms’ (2010) 15 Harv. Negotiation L. Rev. 115, 126; 
Even Sternlight admits the evidence has been anecdotal. See Sternlight, J. R., ‘In Defense of 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration (If Imposed on the Company)’ (Fall 2007) Vol. 8 Issue 1.  
Nevada Law Journal,  pp. 82-106, 83; Sternlight, J.  R. (2012) ‘Tsunami: AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion Impedes Access To Justice’ Vol 90 Oregon Law Review, p703.
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   The counter argument states the philosophical fabric of ADR/ODR is to 
settle disputes quickly, cheaply and efficiently as a result of a less formal 
and flexible system.15 This would not only financially benefit consumers but 
also substantively benefit businesses. By a more proficient planning of re-
sources based on predictable outcome of resolutions, businesses are able to 
re-strategise their assets. It is therefore only fair to expect to see businesses  
aspire in their extravagant use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.  
   The notion of diffused entities influencing the legal landscape to determ-
ine system outcomes inherently implies any attempt towards a counterbal-
ance would be an exercise in fatality. As Judge Posner alluded to in Russell  
v.  Acme-Evans  Co no  matter  what  laws  are  adopted  to  spurn  inequality 
between the parties, the end result is predetermined by “broader structures 
in society that work in the opposite direction”.16 This fatalistic attitude is ec-
lipsed by the direction of EU policy which has been anything but the con-
trary.
2.2 THE EU PROTECTIONIST APPROACH
The omnipotent Council Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts robustly combats business encroachment on consumer rights in 
contracts.17 Article 3(1) of the Directive obliges the need for consensual ne-
gotiated terms. So, “a contractual term which has not been individually ne-
gotiated shall be regarded as unfair if it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties'  rights and obligations”.  Subsection (3) Annex 1(q) provides for a 
presumption of unfairness for terms that would “exclude or hinder the con-
sumer's  right  to  take  legal  action  or  exercise  any  other  legal  remedy”. 
Moreover, Article 6(1) of the Directive establishes the mandate for Member 
states to purify consumer contracts from binding unfair terms.18 The CJEU 
has  incrementally  furthered  this  approach  by  bestowing  national  courts 
with such a determinant.  It held in Elisa Maria Mostaza Claro v Centrol 
Movil Milenium19 the Spanish national court had the requisite right to “de-
termine on its  own motion” what constitutes an unfair  arbitration agree-
15 Schwartz, D. S., ‘If You Love Arbitration, Set it Free: How “Mandatory” Undermines Arbit-
ration’ (Fall 2007) 8 Nev. L. J. 400.   
16 Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 70-71 (7th Cir. 1995);
17 See also an influential soft law in the form of Commission Recommendation 98/257 on the 
principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer dis-
putes [1998] OJ L 115/31.
18 C-237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten [2004] ECR I-3403, para. 22.
19 C-168/05 Elisa Maria Mostaza Claro v Centrol Movil Milenium [2006] ECR I-10421
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ment under the Directive. In Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodrı
´guez  Nogueira,  the  CJEU mandated  an inquisitorial  role  on  the  national 
court.20
These judgements allow national courts as ex officio  to determine the 
permissibility of such clauses, even post-judgement of the arbitration pro-
ceedings. However, by giving leverage to national courts to determine the 
validity of such clauses on grounds of public policy, the CJEU has coron-
ated them with an orifice of profound surgical discretion.  Above all, such a 
move creates four problems affecting the character and future of online ar-
bitration.
Firstly, such ascension by the national courts problematically yields ar-
bitration to a judicial process that goes against its inherent design and re-
solve. Reference to arbitration over litigation has always been made on the 
premise of its quick, fair and efficient finality provisions. Allowing national 
courts to meddle in arbitral affairs assimilates the distinction between these 
two processes by incrementally neutralising arbitration’s informal expedi-
tious disposition.21
Secondly, it is difficult to fathom the logistics of applicability to a low 
value/high volume online environment. In the ODR environment the dy-
namics  of  e-commerce dictate the need to juggle low value/high volume 
transactions  with  the  quality  of  process  and  efficiency,  meshed  in  the 
labyrinth of an uncertain cross-border reality. How can such business mod-
els be under the threat of continuous ubiquitous litigation?22 Reich argues 
this is  entirely dependent on whether arbitration clauses are ‘internal’  or 
‘cross-border’.23 Whittaker  however  explains  the  complexity  involved  in 
validation  and determination  by consumer  choice.24 Allowing  consumers 
“the  choice  between  regimes  (national  law/law  of  habitual  residence  as 
20 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodrı´guez Nogueira, 6 October [2009] Case C-
40/08, para 38.  This inquisitorial role was further affirmed C-243/08, Pannon GSM Zrt. v.  
Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi  [2009] ECR p. I-4713, para 49; and C-137/08, Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt  
v. Ferenc Schneider. – OJ C 13, 15.1 [2011] p. 2.
21 Piers, M., ‘Consumer Arbitration in the EU: A Forced Marriage with Incompatible Expecta-
tions’ (2011) Vol. 2, No. 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement, pp. 209–230, 227-228 
22 Twigg-Flesner, C., ‘Good-Bye Harmonisation by Directives, Hello Cross-Border only Regu-
lation?’  –  A  way  forward  for  EU  Consumer  Contract  Law’  (May  2011)  Vol.  7  No.  2 
European Review of Contract Law, pp235-256, 253-256
23 Norbert Reich, ‘More clarity after Claro?’, (2007) 1 Eur. Rev. Contract L., 41, 53-55, 60-61; See 
also Micklitz, H-W., Reich, N., Rott, P., Understanding EU Consumer Law (Intersentia, Ant-
werp, 2009), paras 7.41, 8.25  
24 Note Whittaker criticises the aspect of consumer choice generically although it stems from 
the provisions of the CESL. Whittaker, S., ‘The Proposed ‘Common European Sales Law’:  
Legal Framework and the Agreement of the Parties’ (2012) 75(4) MLR 578–605, 601-602    
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against the CESL)” further exacerbates the problem of fluency and predict-
ability.25
Thirdly, judicialising the arbitrary process to the idiosyncratic legal scru-
tiny and framework of each nation state, without ‘clear and common min-
imum grounds on which such standards should operate’, introduces ODR 
cross-border legal  uncertainty.26 Incoherent  judgments concerning similar 
ODR situations across  borders may develop inharmonious law.27 Finally, 
purging unfair terms unconnected and immaterial to the point of law de-
bated can lead to dehydrating the potency and appeal of arbitration. 28 For 
example, it is assumed the inevitability of a pro-consumer result could lead 
businesses to take up prescriptive measures. Even so, how feasible is this es-
pecially when the incentive to conform is difficult  to pin down? 29 On the 
contrary,  it  is  such  terms/clauses  that  provide  the  incentive  in  the  first 
place.30 Consequently, it could deter businesses from using arbitration alto-
gether.31
25 Whittaker,  S.,  ‘The Proposed ‘Common European Sales Law’:  Legal Framework and the 
Agreement of the Parties’ (2012) 75(4) MLR 578–605, 601-602; Whittaker, S. ‘The Optional 
Instrument  on  European  Contract  Law  and  Freedom  of  Contract’  (2011)  7  ERCL  371; 
Cartwright, J., ‘Choice is Good: Really?’ (2011) 7 ERCL 335.    
26 Mechantaf, K., ‘Balancing protection and autonomy in consumer arbitrations: an interna-
tional perspective’ (2012) 78(3) Arbitration, 232-246, 245-246.  Mechantaf’s argument to dis-
criminate between the intellectual capacities of the consumer, to distinguish a weaker/un-
aware consumer from a stronger/aware one, in order to determine the applicability of the 
arbitration clause seems like an unquantifiable variable. This in itself would cause dishar-
mony between the already varying states.
27 Norbert Reich, ‘More clarity after Claro?’, (2007) 1 Eur. Rev. Contract L., 41, 44-49
28 Piers, M., ‘Consumer Arbitration in the EU: A Forced Marriage with Incompatible Expecta-
tions’ (2011) Vol. 2, No. 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement, pp. 209–230, 227-228
29 Although Schillig argues the loss of custom (market failure), it is difficult to fathom how ad-
opting a ‘Market for Lemons’ approach would fare any better, especially when it represents 
the progeny of action emanating from the belief and philosophy of ‘inequality of bargaining 
power’. See further Schillig, M., ‘Inequality Of Bargaining Power Versus Market For Lem-
ons: Legal Paradigm Change And The Court Of Justice's Jurisprudence On Directive 93/13 
On Unfair Contract Terms’ (2008) 33(3) E.L. Rev., 336-358,
30 Schmitz, A., ‘Consideration Of “Contracting Culture” In Enforcing Arbitration Provisions’ 
(2007) Vol.81 St John’s Law Review, 123-172, 133.
31 Graf, B.U., and Appleton, A.E., ‘ECJ CASE C 40/08 Asturcom – EU Unfair Terms Law Con-
firmed As A Matter Of Public Policy’ (2010) Vol. 28, No. 2., ASA Bulletin, 413, 417-418.  
To the contrary, Reich and Cortes argue this does not prevent other forms of cheaper final -
ity-absent ODR mechanisms (i.e.  ‘voluntary ombudsman’,  mediation or  assisted negoti-
ation) from being utilised. See further Norbert Reich, ‘More clarity after Claro?’, (2007) 1 
Eur. Rev. Contract L., 41, 59-61; Norbert Reich, “Negotiation and Adjudication. Class Ac-
tions and Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts”, ed by Fabrizio Cafaggi and Hans-W. 
Micklitz, New Frontiers of Consumer Protection: The Interplay Between Private and Public 
Enforcement (Intersentia, Hague, 2009) 345-357;  Cortes, P., Online Dispute Resolution for 
Consumers in the European Union (Routledge, London , 2011) 107-112, 198-206.
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2.3 THE US LAISSEZ FAIRE APPROACH
Conversely,  the  US approach  is  all  but  liberal  in  that  a  presumption  of 
validity  exists  for  arbitration clauses.  The Federal  Arbitration Act  allows 
courts to treat arbitration clauses like any other contractual clause and en-
force them based on specific performance. In Southland Corp. v. Keating ‘it 
was interpreted as a declaration of a national policy favouring arbitration 
that withdrew the power to require a judicial forum which the contracting 
parties agreed to resolve by arbitration’.32 Since, US case law has developed 
in a liberal fashion.33 Consumers have to however refer to “applicable con-
tractual defences, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, to invalidate 
arbitration agreements”.34
Unconscionability  is  a  two limb defence  criterion  that  has  seen more 
than its fare share of cases in determining enforceability.35 It consists of pro-
cedural  and substantive  unconscionability,  and is  seen as  having a high 
threshold for determination.36 The former questions the shortcomings in the 
actual formation of the contract itself. Once this is found, the next question 
is to determine whether such unconscionability is substantial.  This is activ-
ated when there is an imbalance of power within the contractual terms.
In the e-commerce clip-wrap context the determination of unconscionab-
ility has been anything but coherent for the low value/high volume enter-
prise.37 Above all, such incoherence can be attributable to two underlying 
causes. Firstly, it is the US courts that get to determine unconscionability of 
the arbitration terms and not the arbitrators themselves.38 Online commer-
cial platforms, like eBay and Amazon, have free integrated arbitration sys-
tems provided by internal  mechanisms  or  external  subsidiaries.  For  low 
value contracts it would be unfeasible to undertake an expensive enterprise 
32 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) 10-12.
33 Tasker, T., and Pakcyk, D., ‘Cyber-Surfing On The High Seas Of Legalese: Law And Tech-
nology Of Internet Agreements’,  (2008) Vol. 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech, pp 79-149, 147-148.
34 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).  See also Smith, S., ‘Mandatory  
Arbitration Clauses In Consumer Contracts: Consumer Protection And The Circumvention 
Of The Judicial System’ (2001) 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1191, 1236-1237.
35 Smith,  S.,  ‘Mandatory Arbitration Clauses In Consumer Contracts:  Consumer Protection 
And The Circumvention Of The Judicial System’ (2001) 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1191, 1237-1241.
36 Smith,  S.,  ‘Mandatory Arbitration Clauses In Consumer Contracts:  Consumer Protection 
And The Circumvention Of The Judicial System’ (2001) 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1191, 1237-1241.
37 Tasker, T., and Pakcyk, D., ‘Cyber-Surfing On The High Seas Of Legalese: Law And Tech-
nology Of Internet Agreements’,  (2008) Vol. 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech, pp 79-149, 147-148.
38 Friedman, S. 2011 ‘Arbitration Provisions: Little Darlings and Little Monsters’, 79 Fordham 
L. Rev. 2035, 2067.  Cf.  Horton, D. ‘Unconscionability Wars’ (2012) Vol. 106 No.1, North-
western University Law Review, pp387-408, 394.
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of  accessing  justice  via  court  proceedings  when  is  it  offered  for  free. 
Secondly, the threshold of substantive unconscionability would be low for 
e-commerce where immediacy, efficiency, and expediency are so intrinsic to 
its function. Such a reality, where quick arbitration and easy refunds must 
be juxtaposed with the risks involved to businesses with low value cross 
border  transactions,  necessitates  incentivising  businesses  to  undergo this 
risk through greater control of consumer cash and its ultimate destiny i.e. 
chargeback schemes and withholding cash until disputes are settled. This 
would bring them in direct conflict with substantive unconscionability. As a 
result, US courts have not adjusted to this virtual paradigm shift as anticip-
ated, even though this course of direction is nevertheless inevitable.39
3. REFRAMING THE DEBATE: AN INTEREST-BASED SYSTEM 
TRUST APPROACH
3.1 ONLINE TRUST CONSTRUCTION AS AN EMBEDDED 
STRATEGIC DETERMINANT: THE IMPERATIVE OF SYSTEM 
TRUST IN ODR
Trust is an essential, yet an elusive and difficult concept to define. 40 It is a 
highly complex and a multi-dimensional phenomenon, which means differ-
ent things to different people.41 The EU has repeatedly attached its import-
ance to the future growth of e-commerce.42 However, no surgical analysis 
has gone into what this concept entails. Yet, whenever consumer confidence 
is mentioned in EU communications it is mentioned from the parochial nar-
rative of the consumer.43 It is mentioned from the perception of what the 
39 Tasker, T., and Pakcyk, D. 2008,  ‘Cyber-Surfing On The High Seas Of Legalese: Law And 
Technology Of Internet Agreements’,  Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech, Vol. 18, pp 79-149; Trakman, 
L.E. 2007, ‘Adhesion Contracts and the Twenty First Century Consumer’, Berkeley Electron-
ic Press,  at 85-86. Available online at: http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps/art67/, last ac-
cessed: 03/01/2013.  Ponte argues for the need to give more simplified information to con-
sumers in an accessible manner, to legitimise the existence of pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
in the online context.    See Ponte, L. M. 2011, ‘Getting a Bad Rap? Unconscionability in 
Clickwrap Dispute Resolution Clauses and a Proposal for Improving the Quality of These 
Online Consumer "Products"’, Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. Vol. 26, no.1, 119, 159.
40 Ho, B. C. & Oh, K., ‘An empirical study of the use of e-security seals in e-commerce’ (2009)  
Vol. 33 (4) Online Information Review, pp655-671, 656; Its abstract character can be seen in 
Bruce Schneier, Liars and Outliers: Enabling The Trust That Society Needs To Thrive (Indi-
anapolis, John Wiley & Sons, 2012) 243-249
41 Ho, B. C. & Oh, K., ‘An empirical study of the use of e-security seals in e-commerce’ (2009)  
Vol. 33 (4) Online Information Review, pp655-671, 656.
42 Guerra, G. A., Zizzo, D., Dutton, W. & Peltu, M., ‘Economics of Trust in the Information 
Economy: Issues of Identity, Privacy and Security’ (2003) OECD Information Security and 
Privacy Working Paper No.  JT00142557, OII Research Report No. 1, p. 2.
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consumer is thinking and feeling.44 The question is should the EU use this 
type of trust, an exogenic compass of direction, as its leading narrative?  If 
trust is multi-dimensional then why limit it to the frame of the consumer. 
This is  especially so when e-commerce itself  revolves as a system.  Con-
sumers want to trust in the system that provides for them.45
Conversely,  trust  can be  taken as an embedded strategic  determinant 
from the viewpoint of system trust. McKnight et al describe consumer con-
fidence as a “multi-dimensional” concept, measured by the level of percept-
ive trust that exists in each stakeholder within the overall transaction pro-
cess.46 This “multi-disciplinary” form of trust exists in the three main trans-
actional stakeholders, namely the consumer, the seller and the system infra-
structure. Firstly, “dispositional trust” relates to the idiosyncrasy of the con-
sumer, how receptive the consumer is to developing trust in sellers online. 
Secondly, “interpersonal/dyadic” trust concerns the specific interaction with 
the seller, whether the seller’s behaviour and service is deemed trustworthy. 
Finally,  “system/institutional  trust”  involves  consumer  perceptions  of  “fa-
vourable conditions” that advance online commercial activity, which exist in 
the inter-space between the consumer and seller.47
System trust itself is fashioned by three interdependent sub-constructs 
namely  “structural  assurance”,  “facilitating  conditions”  and  “situational 
normality”.48 Structural assurance concerns consumer perceptions on the in-
stitutional  framework of e-commerce that ought to provide the necessary 
43 An example of this can be seen in:  European Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Bring-
ing e-commerce benefits to consumers’, SEC(2011) 1640 final, 11 January, 2012; accompany-
ing Commission Communication, COM(2011) 942 final, 2012, p. 30.
44 European Commission  Staff  Working  Document,  ‘Bringing  e-commerce  benefits  to  con-
sumers’, SEC(2011) 1640 final, 11 January, 2012; accompanying Commission Communica-
tion, COM(2011) 942 final, 2012, p. 30.
45 Pavlou, P.A., Tan, Y. H., and Gefen, D., ‘The Transitional Role of Institutional Trust in On-
line Inter-organizational Relationships’ (2002) Proceedings of the 36th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS’03). Available at: <www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/> last 
accessed: 29/04/2012. Even Schultz argues taking trust from this narrative has not been help-
ful.   See  Schultz,  T.,  ‘Online Arbitration:  Binding  or  Non-Binding?’  (2002)  ADR Online 
Monthly,  1-22, at 4.  Available  at:  <www.ombuds.org/center/adr2002-11-schultz.html> last 
accessed: 12/07/2012.
46 D.H. McKnight, D. H.,  Cummings, L. L., Chervany, N. L., ‘Initial Trust Formation in New 
Organizational Relationships’ (1998) 23 (3) Academy of Management Review, pp473–490, 
477-482; McKnight, D. H., Chervany, N. L., ‘What Trust Means in E-Commerce Customer 
Relationships: An Interdisciplinary Conceptual Typology’ (Winter 2001) Vol.6, No.2 Inter-
national Journal of Electronic Commerce, pp35-59, 45-47; See also Tan, F., and Sutherland, 
P., ‘Online Consumer Trust: A Multi-Dimensional Model’ (2004) 40 2(3) Journal of Electron-
ic Commerce in Organisations, 40-58,
47 McKnight, D. H., Chervany, N. L., ‘What Trust Means in E-Commerce Customer Relation-
ships: An Interdisciplinary Conceptual Typology’ (Winter 2001) Vol.6, No.2 International 
Journal of Electronic Commerce, 35-59, 45-47  
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“protective guarantees, contracts, regulations, promises, legal recourse, pro-
cesses, or procedures” to support transactional success and consumer satis-
faction. Pavlou et al add “facilitating conditions” as an intermediate sub-
construct  to  develop  system  trust.49 These  entail  ‘underlying  non-gov-
ernance mechanisms’, shared standards, relationship values, and common 
beliefs about behaviours and goals’ in the online environment that facilitate 
the  execution  of  behaviour.50 McKnight  et  al  close  with  “situational  nor-
malcy” as the last sub-construct which refers to perceptions of an online set-
ting fulfilling customary and common expectations, giving the overall feel-
ing that things are normal and as they ought to be in order for a successful  
exchange.  Although dispositional  and interpersonal trust is  crucial  to in-
crease functional tranquillity, system trust is seen more if not equally as im-
portant  because  of  its  catalytic  tendencies  and  its  top-down  operational 
management of the status quo.51
Consumers want efficient, effective and fair ODR mechanisms in place to 
facilitate  their  smooth  experience  online.  The  ecological  design  of  ODR 
mechanisms  is  pertinent  in  providing  a  structural  assurance  to  facilitate 
trust in the system infrastructure. The correct building blocks of the ODR 
mechanism are therefore essential  to  achieving this.  What these building 
blocks consist of in terms of who is the “invisible hand” that controls the 
mechanism e.g. government,  platform provider,  or public;  whether these 
building  blocks  encapsulate  formal  or  informal  rules  and  norms;  and 
whether the intra-mechanisms of adjudication are procedurally fair, plays 
an essential role.52 Furthermore, the values and norms that are produced by 
48 Ratnasingam, P., Gefen, D., Pavlou, P.A., ‘The Role of Facilitating Conditions and Institu-
tional Trust in Electronic Marketplaces’ (2005) Vol.3 No.3. Journal of Electronic Commerce 
in Organisations, 69-82, 69-71.
49 Pavlou, P.A., Tan, Y. H., and Gefen, D., ‘The Transitional Role of Institutional Trust in On-
line Interorganizational Relationships’ (2002) Proceedings of the 36th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS’03). Available at: <www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/> last 
accessed: 29/04/2012
50 Note the specified third sub-construct advocated by Pavlou et al is used in a business-2-
business context. Nevertheless, the generality of the concept still stands in relation to busi-
ness-to-consumer situations and is the one advocated. Pavlou, P.A., Tan, Y. H., and Gefen, 
D.,  ‘The Transitional  Role of  Institutional Trust  in  Online Inter-Organizational Relation-
ships’ (2002) Proceedings of the 36th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 
(HICSS’03), 4. Available at: <www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/> last accessed: 29/04/2012.  For a 
bare approach to understanding facilitating conditions see: Triandis, H. C., ‘Values, Atti -
tudes, and Interpersonal Behavior’  In H. E. Howe, Jr. & M. M. Page (Eds.), Nebraska Sym-
posium on Motivation, 1979: Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values (pp.195-259) (Lincoln, NE: Univ. 
of Nebraska Press, 1979) at 205
51 Pennington,  R.,  et  al.  ‘The Role  of  System Trust  In  Business-to-Consumer Transactions’ 
(2003) Vol. 20, No. 3 Journal of Management Information Systems, 197-226
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contracting parties also facilitate in the condition of ODR mechanisms.53 If a 
norm is generated by these relationships which the consumers expect and 
are deprived off, then this situational abnormality can be detrimental to sys-
tem trust. As a result, the formations of ODR mechanisms play a crucial role 
within a system infrastructure and thus can substantially help the develop-
ment of system trust.
3.2 MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES AS “IMPERATIVE 
COGS” IN E-COMMERCE
Legitimacy is a polycephalic concept.54 It has been given different meanings 
by different authors in different situations.55 However, as institutional trust 
in the ODR context concerns its infrastructure, it is institutional legitimacy 
that is sought here.  Instead of viewing the legitimacy of pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clauses through the dichotomous spectacles of ‘repeat player’ versus 
‘consumer  protectionism’,  an  alternative  reframing  is  proposed.  This  re-
framing would mean to take such clauses as an “imperative cog” in the ODR 
arbitration mechanism that directly facilitates in the building of system trust 
in e-commerce. If arbitration is generally regarded as an alternative to litiga-
tion because of its expediency and expeditious process,  then why not ex-
pound upon this objective legitimacy by focusing on its imperative role in 
system trust. That does not mean to blatantly reject the dichotomous prob-
lem altogether. On the contrary, it means to tackle it from the periphery of 
the central issue, its imperative physical contribution as a legal contraption 
to system functionality and utility. This is exactly what Buchanan and Keo-
hane’s “complex standard” of legitimacy does.56 The basis of their rational-
ist-utilitarian claim is that the benefits provided by the institutions or their 
infrastructures  become  the  determinant  of  their  legitimacy.57 Working 
downstream, it is on this premise they seek perceptive legitimacy from the 
52 McKnight, D. H., Chervany, N. L., ‘What Trust Means in E-Commerce Customer Relation-
ships: An Interdisciplinary Conceptual Typology’ (Winter 2001) Vol.6, No.2 International 
Journal of Electronic Commerce, 35-59, 45-47
53 Pavlou, P., and Gefen, D., ‘Building Effective Online Marketplaces with Institution-Based 
Trust’ (March 2004) Vol. 15 No. 1., Information Systems Research, pp. 37–59 
54 Mommers, L., ‘Legitimacy And The Virtualization Of Dispute Resolution’ (2005) 13 Artifi-
cial Intelligence and Law, pp207–232, 208-209.
55 Mommers, L., ‘Legitimacy And The Virtualization Of Dispute Resolution’ (2005) 13 Artifi-
cial Intelligence and Law, pp207–232, 208-209.
56 Buchanan,  A.,  and Keohane,  R.  O.,  ‘The Legitimacy  of  Global  Governance  Institutions’ 
(2006) 20.4 Ethics and International Affairs, pp 405-437,
57 Buchanan,  A.,  and Keohane,  R.  O.,  ‘The Legitimacy  of  Global  Governance  Institutions’ 
(2006) 20.4 Ethics and International Affairs, pp 405-437, 405-407
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people in order to witness efficient functionality of their benefits.58 This le-
gitimacy is therefore deserving of compliance regardless of prior consent.59 
Consent is only sought for efficient functionality.60 That is the reason why 
under this construct “collapsing legitimacy into justice undermines the so-
cial  function  of legitimacy  assessments”.61 If  this  understanding is  trans-
planted into the institutional governance of ODR, arbitration clauses as “im-
perative cogs” in system trust would gain the institutional  legitimacy they 
need. As long as they have an imperative role in system functionality they 
ought to be made legitimate.
Furthermore, viewing legitimacy from the panoptical  prism of system 
trust means by default no ideological inclinations exist towards business or 
consumer protectionism. Rather, such a “structural assurance” would seek 
to facilitate a relationship based on mutual interests, the consummation of 
which would morph back into e-commerce as a state of equilibrium through 
satisfied consumers, the outcome being overall system predictability. This 
reframing  dictates  the  need  for  each  stakeholder  (businesses/affiliations, 
consumers/affiliations, ODR providers, national/pan-national governments) 
to realign their interests from the perspective of trust construction.  Thus, 
such an approach would be the antecedent to Bordone’s ‘interest-based’ ap-
proach, and would depend on it for functionality and the resulting frame-
work.62 This ‘interest-based’ approach is a libertarian construct focusing on 
co-operation rather than antagonism between the different players.63 Any 
antagonism that does exist  will  be subservient to the overall common in-
terest that melts the stakeholders, or its individual progeny that drives each 
stakeholder. This ideological spirit in the system permeates any want of be-
haviour.  The interest-based approach advocated here however is not so lib-
eral as to allow online-communities a free reign.64 Rather, it implies each 
58 Buchanan,  A.,  and  Keohane,  R.  O.,  ‘The  Legitimacy  of  Global  Governance Institutions’ 
(2006) 20.4 Ethics and International Affairs, pp 405-437, 407
59 Buchanan,  A.,  and  Keohane,  R.  O.,  ‘The  Legitimacy  of  Global  Governance Institutions’ 
(2006) 20.4 Ethics and International Affairs, pp 405-437, 412-414
60 Buchanan,  A.,  and  Keohane,  R.  O.,  ‘The  Legitimacy  of  Global  Governance Institutions’ 
(2006) 20.4 Ethics and International Affairs, pp 405-437, 414-416
61 Buchanan,  A.,  and  Keohane,  R.  O.,  ‘The  Legitimacy  of  Global  Governance Institutions’ 
(2006) 20.4 Ethics and International Affairs, pp 405-437, 412
62 Bordone, R. C., ‘Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems Approach-Potential, Prob-
lems, and a Proposal’ (1998) 3 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. pp175-211, 183-193.
63 Bordone, R. C., ‘Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems Approach-Potential, Prob-
lems, and a Proposal’ (1998) 3 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. pp175-211, 188-190.
64 Bordone, R. C., ‘Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems Approach-Potential, Prob-
lems, and a Proposal’ (1998) 3 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. pp175-211, 199-200.
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stakeholder will only take the necessary steps to regulate its own trust-en-
hancing interests without overstepping its need.  In pursuit of this, the by-
product  would  be  Berman’s  “jurisgeneration”,65 norm  generating  com-
munities that interact within what Schmitz terms the “intra contracting cul-
ture”66 that  presides  in  between the relationships  of businesses  and con-
sumers. This would contribute to overall ‘juris-holism’, a term constructed to 
describe the uniformity of individual and random granular norm produc-
tion, spawned in a rich milieu of ‘topological mixing’ throughout the different 
organs of a (contractual) system/relationship, in between ODR and e-com-
merce. In sum, by channelling disputes towards juris-holism and thereby be-
ing a functional imperative of system trust, pre-dispute clauses gain their 
institutional legitimacy.
3.3 APPLYING THE INTEREST-BASED SYSTEM TRUST 
APPROACH TO THE REPEAT PLAYER SCENARIO
As Grossman et al concluded tackling the Repeat Player phenomenon must 
take “account of alterations in the legal culture and normative systems” that 
have evolved.67 This means with the birth of privately formalised ODR sys-
tems (a symbiosis of ADR, e-business and technology resulting in a new 
paradigm  of  administrative  and  legal  culture)  the  relationship  between 
businesses, consumers and those that facilitate such a relationship needs to 
be  re-examined.  Yes,  Hornle is  agreeable in  asserting technology exacer-
bates the problem of Repeat-Players, but this is dependent on how the prob-
lem is framed.68 E-virtual environments are competitive in all respects in-
cluding linking the most efficient and justiciable dispute resolution mechan-
isms to the ongoing concern of profit.  As a result, “the relative advantages 
between and among disputants  is  more  nuanced and dynamic  than the 
terms one shotter and repeat player suggest”, especially where the “dichotom-
ous winner-loser paradigm” shrouding the finality of judgment is not so ap-
parent.69
Repeat-Playing is a strategic characteristic formulating the disposition of 
a business personality. It stems from an underlying belief that determining 
65 Berman, P. S.,  ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review, 1155, 
1166.
66 Schmitz, A., ‘Consideration Of “Contracting Culture” In Enforcing Arbitration Provisions’ 
(2007) Vol.81 St John’s Law Review, 123-172, 148-154.
67 Grossman, J. B., Kritzer, H. M., Macaulay, S., ‘Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?’ (1999) 
33 Law & Soc'y Rev. 803, 808-810
68 Hörnle, J., Cross Border Internet Dispute Resolution (CUP, Cambridge, 2009) 74-90
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system outcomes is key to long term financial interests.70 Businesses are not 
born with it, rather choose to adopt it. The question is what if e-business 
platforms, intermediaries and service providers adopt a counter strategy to 
“risk aversion” of litigation.  A strategy that revolves around consumer in-
terests, believing such a centric relationship would secure a similar financial 
future.71 This business model would evolve into an introspective consumer-
centric personality, which would form its “interest-based” philosophical un-
derpinning,  evolving into informal “contracting cultural norms”72.73 Com-
mercial platforms like Amazon and eBay have long argued their position is 
to facilitate the relationship between businesses and consumers.  Although 
eBay has strongly  maintained a central-facilitative  position,  Amazon has 
been ostentating its consumer-centric philosophy. Both positions neverthe-
less advocate the need for impartiality as anything to the contrary would 
lead to failure of consumer trust in the system and generally online transac-
tions.74 Consequently,  this  begs  the  question  how  would  such  con-
sumer-centric business models fair in reality?
3.4 INTEREST-BASED CONSUMER CENTRICITY DEFEATS 
REPEAT PLAYING
A good example of an Interest-Based System-Trust  approach in  action is 
Amazon’s A-to-Z Buyer Guarantee, which promotes a conspicuously con-
sumer-centric  policy  in  ODR  determining  its  overall  personality.   This 
policy has helped it reshape the stronger-weaker paradigm in buying and 
selling.  Immediate buyer refunds and return of products at buyer’s discre-
tion have allowed Amazon to gain consumer loyalty. Amazon as seller al-
69 Grossman, J. B., Kritzer, H. M., Macaulay, S., ‘Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?’ (1999) 
33 Law & Soc'y Rev. 809-810.  Rule observes “The highest frustration came from buyers 
who had their case take weeks to get resolved even if they ended up winning.  They were 
far more frustrated than buyers that got a quick decision and lost.” Colin Rule, ‘Presenta-
tion  for  Internet  Bar  Government  2.0’.  Available  at:  <http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=hRyvv7eX3NI> last accessed: 21/03/2012
70 Galanter, Marc., ‘Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change’ (1974) 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 95-100
71 Kobayashi illustrates how different business models are introspectively unique in develop-
ing their own informal norms. However, he does not tackle it from a consumer centric nar-
rative.  See Kobayashi, I., ‘Private Contracting And Business Models Of Electronic Com-
merce’ (2004-2005) 13 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 161,161-172
72 Schmitz, A., ‘Consideration Of “Contracting Culture” In Enforcing Arbitration Provisions’ 
(2007) Vol.81 St John’s Law Review, 123-172, 148-154.
73 Kobayashi, I., ‘Private Contracting And Business Models Of Electronic Commerce’ (2004-
2005) 13 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 161.  161-172
74 Rule, C., and Friedberg, L., ‘The Appropriate Role of Dispute Resolution in Building Trust 
Online’ (June 2005) Vol. 13, 2 Journal Artificial Intelligence and Law, pp 193–205, 196-198
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lows  consumers  to  keep  substantially  delayed,  damaged  and  defective 
items.
However, through the pressures of the ‘intra-contracting culture’,75 this 
policy has permeated to those third-party sellers who are not part of its Ful-
filment programme. Traders feel compelled to adhere to the unique actions 
of Amazon, letting buyers keep damaged goods, while at the same time be-
coming part of consumers’ natural expectations. This natural transition, os-
mosis  of  the  third  kind,  trans-morphs  localised  parental  obligations  to 
broader communal conventions. Such clearly visible interplay between vari-
ous actors pursuing their interests and inadvertently producing norms in 
dispute resolution is indicative of Berman’s juris (norm)-generation.76
Accordingly, to argue Amazon’s consumer-centric A-to-Z guarantee is 
bias and therefore impartial would be wrong.  It would conform to the pro-
cedural fairness from the understanding of system predictability, as the in-
teraction between the varying parties is doing exactly that, with the busi-
ness model of consumer-centricism coming out top.77 Amazon’s integrated 
feedback and performance regime keeps sellers on a tight leash via the met-
rics  with thresholds measuring  prompt  delivery,  responsive  communica-
tion, and positive feedback. If sellers attained a level below their targets, 
they  would  be  put  on  probation,  where  unresponsive  behaviour  would 
mean  end-game  ostracism  from  the  marketplace.  Sellers  must  therefore 
show positive engagement, a synonym for soft coercion into finality. As a 
consequence, Amazon suffers from a lot of seller distaste. This is neverthe-
less not enough for them to leave and seek another platform. The financial 
incentives to stay and take on the consumer-centric policies are far greater.
Conversely,  to  counter-balance  this  position  it  could  adopt  a  vertic-
al-crowdsourced ODR scheme that would allow the balance to recede to-
wards the middle, and satisfy seller ranks.78 Crowdsourced ODR operates 
by  “shifting  the  centre  of  arbitrary  decision-making”  from  an  internal, 
75 Schmitz, A., ‘Consideration Of “Contracting Culture” In Enforcing Arbitration Provisions’ 
(2007) Vol.81 St John’s Law Review, 123-172, 148-154.
76 Berman, P. S.,  ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review, 1155, 
1166
77 Schultz discusses the importance of system predictability  over procedural fairness.   See 
Schultz, T., ‘Internet Disputes, Fairness In Arbitration and Transnationalism: A Reply To Ju-
lia Hornle’ (2011) 19(2) I.J.L. & I.T. 153-163, 156-160.
78 Herik, Jaap V., and Dimov, D., ‘Towards Crowdsourced Online Dispute Resolution’ (2012) 
Vol. 7, Issue 2, Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, 99-111, 109-111; 
Dimov D., ‘Croudsourced Online Dispute Reolution – The New ADR’ (31st July) eQuibbly  
Blog. Available at: <http://equibbly.wordpress.com/author/equibblybloggy/> last accessed: 
19/08/2012.
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single homogenous person/group of persons to an external diverse group of 
people with different “ideas, knowledge, and experience”, crucially directly 
unaffiliated with the parties involved.79 Its vertical isotope however would 
retain its ultimate stakeholder position, and only allow direct-deliberation 
between itself and the crowd, with the ability to veto decisions under excep-
tional vetted circumstances. This would democratise and sanitise the arbit-
ral procedure, further contributing to ‘juris-holism’ and above all allow for, 
in the least, greater perceived fairness, which would enhance overall system 
trust.80
4. CONCLUSION
“To keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of 
intelligent tinkering” – Aldo Leopold81
E-commerce is not seeing the surplus trajectory that has been expected of it. 
For it to be successful it needs mechanisms that facilitate its progress. ODR 
is at the forefront of any needed mechanism. Consumers need to be rest as-
sured  their  disputes  are  going  to  be  resolved efficiently,  effectively  and 
fairly.  This trust is not just limited to how they think or feel about what 
happens to them but rather in the apparatus they use and how these appar-
atus are managed. How the ODR system is designed will  tangibly affect 
their trust in the system that resolves their disputes.  The problem is the EU 
only tackles the issue of trust from the parochial mindset of the consumer. 
It does not look at this issue intrinsically from the system itself.  This author 
advocates the need to reject accepting trust as an endogenic compass of dir-
ection by adopting personal consumer trust. Rather, it must accept it as an 
embedded strategic determinant in the form of system trust.
The EU’s prohibitive approach on pre-dispute arbitration clauses stems 
from the basis of levelling the playing field for both the business and con-
79 Grier, David A., ‘What Crowdsourcing Does To Your Business’ (July 19th 2012) CROWDO-
POLIS. Available at: <http://dailycrowdsource.com> last accessed: 19/08/2012.
80 Even Rogers recognises “perceived fairness is as essential as actual fairness in establishing 
the legitimacy of a particular dispute resolution process”.  Rogers, Catherine A., ‘The Ar-
rival Of The "Have-Nots" In International Arbitration’ (2007-2008) 8 Nev. L.J. 341, 355.  See 
also DeMars, J., Nauss Exon, S., Kovach, K.K., and Rule, C., ‘Virtual Virtues: Ethical Consid-
erations for an Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) Practice’ (Fall 2010) Dispute Resolution 
Magazine 6, 7-8.
81 Leopold, Aldo. Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There (1st edition ed.1 New 
York: Oxford University Press. 1949) 152. Available at: <http://leopold.wilderness.net/abou-
tus/aldo.htm.> last accessed: 13/12/2012. 
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sumer by curtailing the practice of repeat-playing. The dynamics of online 
commercial  enterprise  are  however  producing  alternate  business  models 
and structures. Business platforms with consumer-centric personalities are 
attracting huge volumes of transactions. These interest-based business mod-
els have commanding incentives to work towards building trust in the over-
all  system  (platform/e-commerce).  Their  fabric  of  operations  (including 
feedback  and chargeback mechanisms)  and subsequent  interactions  with 
the different stakeholders are producing norms of behaviour where finality 
is softly coerced from sellers in favour of consumers.
The EU must therefore look at its Jenga policy of arbitration clauses bey-
ond the parochial blemish of ‘inequality of bargaining powers’.  To be care-
less by blacklisting them, for example in the proposal  for a Directive on 
ADR, can determine a negative course of direction for system trust.  The 
need exists to expound upon their utility as “imperative cogs” in any regulat-
ory machinery, even if industry specific, designed to construct system trust 
in e-commerce.
